Publication Type
Conference Proceeding Article
Version
publishedVersion
Publication Date
3-2014
Abstract
Usability is an important aspect of security, because poor usability motivates users to find shortcuts that bypass the system. Existing studies on keystroke biometrics evaluate the usability issue in terms of the average false rejection rate (FRR). We show in this paper that such an approach underestimates the user impact in two ways. First, the FRR of keystroke biometrics changes for the worse under a range of common conditions such as background music, exercise and even game playing. In a user study involving 111 participants, the average penalties (increases) in FRR are 0.0360 and 0.0498, respectively, for two different classifiers. Second, presenting the FRR as an average obscures the fact that not everyone is suitable for keystroke biometrics deployment. For example, using a Monte Carlo simulation, we found that 30% of users would encounter an account lockout before their 50th authentication session (given a lockout policy of 3 attempts) if they are affected by external influences 50% of the time when authenticating.
Keywords
authentication, human factors, keystroker biometrics
Discipline
Information Security
Research Areas
Cybersecurity
Publication
CODASPY '14: Proceedings of the 4th ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy: March 3-5, San Antonio, TX
First Page
289
Last Page
296
ISBN
9781450322782
Identifier
10.1145/2557547.2557573
Publisher
ACM
City or Country
New York
Embargo Period
3-23-2022
Citation
TEY, Chee Meng; GUPTA, Payas; MURALIDARAN, Kartik; and GAO, Debin.
Keystroke biometrics: The user perspective. (2014). CODASPY '14: Proceedings of the 4th ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy: March 3-5, San Antonio, TX. 289-296.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/7032
Copyright Owner and License
Authors
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.
Additional URL
https://doi.org/10.1145/2557547.2557573