Publication Type

Conference Proceeding Article

Version

publishedVersion

Publication Date

1-2021

Abstract

Incentive misalignment in rewards-based crowd-funding occurs because creators may benefit disproportionately from fundraising, while backers may benefit disproportionately from the quality of project deliverables. The resulting principal-agent relationship means backers rely on campaign information to identify signs of moral hazard, adverse selection, and risk attitude asymmetry. We analyze campaign information related to fundraising, and compare how different information affects eventual backer satisfaction, based on an extensive dataset from Kickstarter. The data analysis uses a multi-model comparison to reveal similarities and contrasts in the estimated drivers of dependent variables that capture different outcomes in Kickstarter’s funding campaigns, using a linear probability model (LPM), which is a special case of the binary probability model. Our results reveal inconsistencies in funding information compared to backers’ satisfaction, and a platform-wide trend of decreasing satisfaction. The findings broadly suggest fundraising is influenced by information disclosure and backer feedback, while eventual backer satisfaction is closely potentially caused by information about deferred compensation and long-term relationship-building.

Keywords

rewards-based crowdfunding, Kickstarter, fundraising

Discipline

Databases and Information Systems | E-Commerce | Strategic Management Policy

Research Areas

Information Systems and Management

Publication

Proceedings of the 54th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences 2021: Virtual, January 5-8

First Page

6543

Last Page

6552

ISBN

9780998133140

Identifier

10.24251/HICSS.2021.787

Publisher

IEEE Computer Society

City or Country

Los Alamitos, CA

Additional URL

https://doi.org/10.24251/HICSS.2021.787

Download

Share

COinS