Publication Type
Conference Proceeding Article
Version
publishedVersion
Publication Date
12-2005
Abstract
A forward secure blind signature scheme was proposed by Duc, Cheon and Kim, in ICICS 2003. The security of the scheme was proved to be equivalent to the strong RSA assumption in the random oracle model. In this paper we present an attack to the scheme by forging valid signatures with public keys only. The attack is so efficient that forging a valid signature needs less computation than legally generating a signature, even considering only the user side. Our result implies that the security proof of the scheme must be invalid. Furthermore we point out the fault of the proof and explain why it invalidates the proof.
Keywords
Blind signature, Cryptanalysis, Forward security, Provable security, Strong RSA assumption
Discipline
Information Security
Research Areas
Cybersecurity
Publication
Information and Communications Security: 7th International Conference, ICICS 2005, Beijing, China, December 10-13: Proceedings
Volume
3783
First Page
53
Last Page
60
ISBN
9783540320999
Identifier
10.1007/11602897_5
Publisher
Springer
City or Country
Berlin
Citation
WANG, Shuhong; BAO, Feng; and DENG, Robert H..
Cryptanalysis of a Forward Secure Blind Signature Scheme with Provable Security. (2005). Information and Communications Security: 7th International Conference, ICICS 2005, Beijing, China, December 10-13: Proceedings. 3783, 53-60.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/564
Copyright Owner and License
Publisher
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.
Additional URL
https://doi.org/10.1007/11602897_5