Publication Type

Conference Proceeding Article

Version

publishedVersion

Publication Date

4-2007

Abstract

In this paper, we analyze the security vulnerabilities of EMAP, an efficient RFID mutual authentication protocol recently proposed by Peris-Lopez et al. (2006). We present two effective attacks, a de-synchronization attack and a full-disclosure attack, against the protocol. The former permanently disables the authentication capability of a RFID tag by destroying synchronization between the tag and the RFID reader. The latter completely compromises a tag by extracting all the secret information stored in the tag. The de-synchronization attack can be carried out in just round of interaction in EMAP while the full-disclosure attack is accomplished across several runs of EMAP. We also discuss ways to counter the attacks

Keywords

vulnerability analysis, EMAP protocol, efficient RFID mutual authentication protocol, security vulnerabilities, desynchronization attack, full-disclosure attack

Discipline

Information Security

Research Areas

Information Security and Trust

Publication

2007 2nd International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security (ARES): Vienna, April 10-13: Proceedings

First Page

238

Last Page

245

ISBN

9780769527758

Identifier

10.1109/ARES.2007.159

Publisher

IEEE Computer Society

City or Country

Los Alamitos, CA

Copyright Owner and License

Publisher

Additional URL

https://doi.org/10.1109/ARES.2007.159

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