Publication Type
Journal Article
Version
publishedVersion
Publication Date
1-2020
Abstract
Data deduplication eliminates redundant data and is receiving increasing attention in cloud storage services due to the proliferation of big data and the demand for efficient storage. Data deduplication not only requires a consummate technological designing, but also involves multiple parties with conflict interests. Thus, how to design incentive mechanisms and study their acceptance by all relevant stakeholders remain important open issues. In this paper, we detail the payoff structure of a client-controlled deduplication scheme and analyze the feasibilities of unified discount and individualized discount under this structure. Through game theoretical study, a privacy-preserving individualized discount-based incentive mechanism is further proposed with detailed implementation algorithms for choosing strategies, setting parameters and granting discounts. After theoretical analysis on the requirements of individual rationality, incentive compatibility, and profitability, we conduct extensive experiments based on a real-world dataset to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed incentive mechanism.
Keywords
Cloud data deduplication, Free riding, Game theory, Incentive mechanism, Privacy
Discipline
Information Security
Research Areas
Cybersecurity
Publication
Computers and Security
Volume
91
First Page
1
Last Page
14
ISSN
0167-4048
Identifier
10.1016/j.cose.2020.101730
Publisher
Elsevier
Citation
LIANG, Xueqin; YAN, Zheng; and DENG, Robert H..
Game theoretical study on client-controlled cloud data deduplication. (2020). Computers and Security. 91, 1-14.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/5062
Copyright Owner and License
Authors
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.
Additional URL
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2020.101730