Publication Type
Conference Proceeding Article
Version
acceptedVersion
Publication Date
11-2017
Abstract
A long-standing research problem is how to efficiently verify security protocols with tamper-resistant global states, especially when the global states evolve unboundedly. We propose a protocol specification framework, which facilitates explicit modeling of states and state transformations. On the basis of that, we develop an algorithm for verifying security properties of protocols with unbounded state-evolving, by tracking state transformation and checking the validity of the state-evolving traces. We prove the correctness of the verification algorithm, implement both of the specification framework and the algorithm, and evaluate our implementation using a number of stateful security protocols. The experimental results show that our approach is both feasible and practically efficient. Particularly, we have found a security flaw on the digital envelope protocol, which cannot be detected with existing security protocol verifiers.
Keywords
Protocol specifications, Security properties, Security protocols
Discipline
Information Security
Research Areas
Cybersecurity
Publication
Formal Methods and Software Engineering: 19th International Conference on Formal Engineering Methods, ICFEM 2017, Xi'an, China, November 13-17: Proceedings
Volume
10610
First Page
262
Last Page
280
ISBN
9783319686899
Identifier
10.1007/978-3-319-68690-5_16
Publisher
Springer
City or Country
Cham
Citation
LI, Li; DONG, Naipeng; PANG, Jun; SUN, Jun; BAI, Guangdong; LIU, Yang; and DONG, Jin Song.
A verification framework for stateful security protocols. (2017). Formal Methods and Software Engineering: 19th International Conference on Formal Engineering Methods, ICFEM 2017, Xi'an, China, November 13-17: Proceedings. 10610, 262-280.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/4722
Copyright Owner and License
Authors
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.
Additional URL
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-68690-5_16