Publication Type
Journal Article
Version
acceptedVersion
Publication Date
11-2019
Abstract
Benefiting from the advancement of algorithms in massive data and powerful computing resources, deep learning has been explored in a wide variety of fields and produced unparalleled performance results. It plays a vital role in daily applications and is also subtly changing the rules, habits, and behaviors of society. However, inevitably, data-based learning strategies are bound to cause potential security and privacy threats, and arouse public as well as government concerns about its promotion to the real world. In this article, we mainly focus on data security issues in deep learning. We first investigate the potential threats of deep learning in this area, and then present the latest countermeasures based on various underlying technologies, where the challenges and research opportunities on offense and defense are also discussed. Then, we propose SecureNet, the first verifiable and privacy-preserving prediction protocol to protect model integrity and user privacy in DNNs. It can significantly resist various security and privacy threats during the prediction process. We simulate SecureNet under a real dataset, and the experimental results show the superior performance of SecureNet for detecting various integrity attacks against DNN models.
Keywords
Integrity attacks, Learning strategy, Potential threats, Prediction process, Privacy preserving
Discipline
Information Security
Research Areas
Cybersecurity
Publication
IEEE Communications Magazine
Volume
57
Issue
11
First Page
116
Last Page
122
ISSN
0163-6804
Identifier
10.1109/MCOM.001.1900091
Publisher
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
Citation
XU, Guowen; LI, Hongwei; REN, Hao; YANG, Kan; and DENG, Robert H..
Data security issues in deep learning: attacks, countermeasures, and opportunities. (2019). IEEE Communications Magazine. 57, (11), 116-122.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/4673
Copyright Owner and License
Authors
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.
Additional URL
https://doi.org/10.1109/MCOM.001.1900091