Publication Type

Conference Proceeding Article

Version

acceptedVersion

Publication Date

8-2013

Abstract

Effective enforcement of laws and policies requires expending resources to prevent and detect offenders, as well as appropriate punishment schemes to deter violators. In particular, enforcement of privacy laws and policies in modern organizations that hold large volumes of personal information (e.g., hospitals, banks) relies heavily on internal audit mechanisms. We study economic considerations in the design of these mechanisms, focusing in particular on effective resource allocation and appropriate punishment schemes. We present an audit game model that is a natural generalization of a standard security game model for resource allocation with an additional punishment parameter. Computing the Stackelberg equilibrium for this game is challenging because it involves solving an optimization problem with non-convex quadratic constraints. We present an additive FPTAS that efficiently computes the solution.

Discipline

Artificial Intelligence and Robotics

Research Areas

Data Science and Engineering

Publication

Proceedings of the 23rd international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence, Beijing, China, 2013 August 3-9

First Page

41

Last Page

47

ISBN

9781577356332

Publisher

ACM

City or Country

Beijing China

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