Publication Type
Journal Article
Version
publishedVersion
Publication Date
11-2016
Abstract
Proxy re-encryption allows a semi-trusted proxy with a re-encryption key to convert a delegator's ciphertext into a delegatee's ciphertext, and the semi-trusted proxy cannot learn anything about the underlying plaintext. If a proxy re-encryption scheme is indistinguishable against chosen-ciphertext attacks, its initialized ciphertext should be non-malleable. Otherwise, there might exist an adversary who can break the chosen-ciphertext security of the scheme. Recently, Liang et al. proposed two proxy re-encryption schemes. They claimed that their schemes were chosen-ciphertext secure in the standard model. However, we find that the original ciphertext in their schemes are malleable. Thus, we present some concrete attacks and indicate their schemes fail to achieve chosen-ciphertext security in the standard model.
Keywords
Conditional proxy re-encryption, Identity-based, Single hop, Multi-hop, Chosen-ciphertext security
Discipline
Information Security
Research Areas
Cybersecurity
Publication
Theoretical Computer Science
Volume
652
First Page
18
Last Page
27
ISSN
0304-3975
Identifier
10.1016/j.tcs.2016.08.023
Publisher
Elsevier
Citation
HE, Kai; WENG, Jian; DENG, Robert H.; and LIU, Joseph K..
On the security of two identity-based conditional proxy re-encryption schemes. (2016). Theoretical Computer Science. 652, 18-27.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/3881
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.
Additional URL
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tcs.2016.08.023