Publication Type
Conference Proceeding Article
Publication Date
12-2009
Abstract
In USENIX Security 08, Juels, Pappu and Parno proposed a secret sharing based mechanism to alleviate the key distribution problem in RFID-enabled supply chains. Compared to existing pseudonym based RFID protocols, the secret sharing based solution is more suitable for RFID-enabled supply chains since it does not require a database of keys be distributed among supply chain parties for secure ownership transfer of RFID tags. However, this mechanism cannot resist tag tracking and tag counterfeiting attacks in supply chain systems. It is also not convenient for downstream supply chain parties to adjust the size of RFID tag collections in recovering tag keys. To address these problems, we propose a flexible and secure secret update protocol which enables each supply chain party to update tag keys in a secure and efficient manner. Our proposal enhances the previous secret sharing based mechanism in that it not only solves the flexibility problem in unidirectional key distribution, but also ensures the security for ownership transfer of tags in RFID-enabled supply chains.
Discipline
Information Security
Research Areas
Cybersecurity
Publication
Information and Communications Security: 11th International Conference, ICICS 2009, Beijing, China, December 14-17: Proceedings
Volume
5927
First Page
150
Last Page
164
ISBN
9783642111457
Identifier
10.1007/978-3-642-11145-7_13
Publisher
Springer Verlag
City or Country
Berlin
Citation
CAI, Shaoying; LI, Tieyan; MA, Changshe; LI, Yingjiu; and DENG, Robert H..
Enabling Secure Secret Updating for Unidirectional Key Distribution in RFID-Enabled Supply Chains. (2009). Information and Communications Security: 11th International Conference, ICICS 2009, Beijing, China, December 14-17: Proceedings. 5927, 150-164.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/271
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.
Additional URL
http://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-11145-7_13
Comments
5927/2009