Publication Type
Journal Article
Version
publishedVersion
Publication Date
2-2026
Abstract
Rationalization, a data-centric framework, aims to build self-explanatory models to explain the prediction outcome by generating a subset of human-intelligible pieces of the input data. It involves a cooperative game model where a generator generates the most human-intelligible parts of the input (i.e., rationales), followed by a predictor that makes predictions based on these generated rationales. Conventional rationalization methods typically impose constraints via regularization terms to calibrate or penalize undesired generation. However, these methods are suffering from a problem called mode collapse, in which the predictor produces correct predictions yet the generator consistently outputs rationales with collapsed patterns. Moreover, existing studies are typically designed separately for specific collapsed patterns, lacking a unified consideration. In this paper, we systematically revisit cooperative rationalization from a novel game-theoretic perspective and identify the fundamental cause of this problem: the generator no longer tends to explore new strategies to uncover informative rationales, ultimately leading the system to converge to a suboptimal game equilibrium (correct predictions versus collapsed rationales). To solve this problem, we then propose a novel approach, Game-theoretic Policy Optimization oriented RATionalization (PoRat), which progressively introduces policy interventions to address the game equilibrium in the cooperative game process, thereby guiding the model toward a more optimal solution state. We theoretically analyse the cause of such a suboptimal equilibrium and prove the feasibility of the proposed method. Furthermore, we validate our method on nine widely used real-world datasets and two synthetic settings, where PoRat achieves up to 8.1% performance improvements over existing state-of-the-art methods.
Keywords
Data-centric Explainability, Self-explanation, Rationale Mining, Game-theoretic Policy Optimization
Discipline
Artificial Intelligence and Robotics | Databases and Information Systems
Publication
IEEE Transactions on Knowledge and Data Engineering
Volume
38
Issue
2
First Page
1159
Last Page
1173
ISSN
1041-4347
Identifier
10.1109/TKDE.2025.3638864
Publisher
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
Citation
ZHAO, Yunxiao; WANG, Zhiqiang; YU, Xingtong; LI, Xiaoli; LIANG, Jiye; and LI, Ru.
Learnable game-theoretic policy optimization for data-centric self-explanation rationalization. (2026). IEEE Transactions on Knowledge and Data Engineering. 38, (2), 1159-1173.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/11264
Creative Commons License

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.
Additional URL
https://doi.org/10.1109/TKDE.2025.3638864