Publication Type

Journal Article

Version

publishedVersion

Publication Date

4-2026

Abstract

Zero-knowledge Succinct Non-interactive Argument of Knowledge (zkSNARK) is a powerful cryptographic primitive that enables a prover to convince a verifier that something is true without leaking the private witness.Current zkSNARKs face significant computational costs in generating proofs, which restricts their use in areas like private payments, confidential smart contracts, and anonymous credentials. Private delegation offers a practical solution by outsourcing the heavy computation to powerful external workers without leaking any private information. In this work, we propose HyperSiniel, an efficient private delegation framework for general zkSNARKs that achieves a new feature called guaranteed output delivery (GOD). HyperSiniel is designed to be compatible with any universal zkSNARKs constructed from a polynomial interactive oracle proof (PIOP) and a polynomial commitment scheme (PCS). It enables a computationally limited delegator to outsource proof generation to several workers in a fully noninteractive and privacy-preserving manner. Compared to the most state-of-the-art frameworks (e.g., Siniel [NDSS’25]), HyperSiniel ensures that the delegator always receives a correct proof, regardless of malicious worker behavior. We implement HyperSiniel and compare the performance with Siniel across varying bandwidths and circuit sizes. Under low-bandwidth conditions (10 MBps), HyperSiniel incurs only an additional 25% overhead compared with Siniel, while the total running time of HyperSiniel is almost identical to Siniel under high-bandwidth settings (1000 MBps). These results show that the strong robustness guarantee of GOD in HyperSiniel comes almost for free, making it a practical and secure solution for real-world zkSNARK delegation.

Keywords

Multiparty computation, private delegation, zero-knowledge proof

Discipline

Information Security

Research Areas

Cybersecurity

Publication

IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing

Volume

23

Issue

2

First Page

3769

Last Page

3783

ISSN

1545-5971

Identifier

10.1109/TDSC.2025.3641201

Publisher

Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers

Additional URL

https://doi.org/10.1109/TDSC.2025.3641201

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