Publication Type
Journal Article
Version
acceptedVersion
Publication Date
6-2025
Abstract
Federated learning (FL), as a powerful learning paradigm, trains a shared model by aggregating model updates from distributed clients. However, the decoupling of model learning from local data makes FL highly vulnerable to backdoor attacks, where a single compromised client can poison the shared model. While recent progress has been made in backdoor detection, existing methods face challenges with detection accuracy and runtime effectiveness, particularly when dealing with complex model architectures. In this work, we propose a novel approach to detecting malicious clients in an accurate, stable, and efficient manner. Our method utilizes a sampling-based network representation method to quantify dissimilarities between clients, identifying model deviations caused by backdoor injections. We also propose an iterative algorithm to progressively detect and exclude malicious clients as outliers based on these dissimilarity measurements. Evaluations across a range of benchmark tasks demonstrate that our approach outperforms state-of-the-art methods in detection accuracy and defense effectiveness. When deployed for runtime protection, our approach effectively eliminates backdoor injections with marginal overheads.
Keywords
Computational Modeling, Training, Data Models, Runtime, Accuracy, Predictive Models, Servers, Federated Learning, Inspection, Filters, Backdoor Detection, Federated Learning
Discipline
Artificial Intelligence and Robotics
Research Areas
Intelligent Systems and Optimization
Areas of Excellence
Digital transformation
Publication
IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
Volume
22
Issue
5
First Page
4607
Last Page
4624
ISSN
1545-5971
Identifier
10.1109/TDSC.2025.3550330
Publisher
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
Citation
ZHANG, Xiyue; XUE, Xiaoyong; DU, Xiaoning; XIE, Xiaofei; LIU, Yang; and SUN, Meng.
Runtime backdoor detection for federated learning via representational dissimilarity analysis. (2025). IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing. 22, (5), 4607-4624.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/10606
Creative Commons License

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.
Additional URL
https://doi.ieeecomputersociety.org/10.1109/TDSC.2025.3550330