Publication Type

Journal Article

Version

acceptedVersion

Publication Date

9-2025

Abstract

Many logistics platforms enable collaboration between agents to reduce costs, but determining fair pricing remains challenging when agents have pre-existing partnerships. This paper introduces a cooperative game theory framework to model platform-mediated collaboration, modeling the platform as an additional player. We present a novel characteristic function that distinguishes between partial collaborations (existing relationships) and full collaborations (platform-enabled). Using Shapley value, we derive fair cost allocations and platform charges that reflect each participant's contribution. We address stability concerns through an optimization model that minimizes platform subsidies while preventing profitable deviations. The framework is demonstrated through an application in freight forwarding for Less-than-Container Load (LCL) consolidation, showing how it balances participant incentives with platform revenue across varying collaboration structures and network sizes.

Keywords

Collaborative Logistics, Cooperative Game Theory, Freight Forwarding, LCL Consolidation

Discipline

Artificial Intelligence and Robotics

Research Areas

Intelligent Systems and Optimization

Areas of Excellence

Sustainability

Publication

Proceedings of the Sixteenth International Conference on Computational Logistics, Delft and Rotterdam, Netherlands, 2025 September 8-10

First Page

1

Last Page

15

Embargo Period

12-3-2025

Additional URL

https://easychair.org/smart-program/ICCLEuroMar2025/

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