Publication Type

Conference Proceeding Article

Version

publishedVersion

Publication Date

7-2025

Abstract

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to backdoor attacks that manipulate outputs via hidden triggers. Existing defense methods—designed for vision/text classification tasks—fail for text generation. We propose Internal Consistency Regularization (CROW), a defense leveraging the observation that backdoored models exhibit unstable layer-wise hidden representations when triggered, while clean models show smooth transitions. CROW enforces consistency across layers via adversarial perturbations and regularization during finetuning, neutralizing backdoors without requiring clean reference models or trigger knowledge—only a small clean dataset. Experiments across Llama-2 (7B, 13B), CodeLlama (7B, 13B), and Mistral-7B demonstrate CROW’s effectiveness: it achieves significant reductions in attack success rates across diverse backdoor strategies (sentiment steering, targeted refusal, code injection) while preserving generative performance. CROW’s architectureagnostic design enables practical deployment.

Discipline

Programming Languages and Compilers | Software Engineering

Research Areas

Software and Cyber-Physical Systems

Areas of Excellence

Digital transformation

Publication

Proceedings of the 42nd International Conference on Machine Learning, Vancouver, Canada, 2025 July 13-19

First Page

1

Last Page

20

Identifier

10.48550/arXiv.2411.12768

City or Country

Canada

Additional URL

https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2411.12768

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