Publication Type
Conference Proceeding Article
Version
publishedVersion
Publication Date
4-2025
Abstract
Despite their advances and success, real-world deep neural networks are known to be vulnerable to adversarial attacks. Universal adversarial perturbation, an inputagnostic attack, poses a serious threat for them to be deployed in security-sensitive systems. In this case, a single universal adversarial perturbation deceives the model on a range of clean inputs without requiring input-specific optimization, which makes it particularly threatening. In this work, we observe that universal adversarial perturbations usually lead to abnormal entropy spectrum in hidden layers, which suggests that the prediction is dominated by a small number of “feature” in such cases (rather than democratically by many features). Inspired by this, we propose an efficient yet effective defense method for mitigating UAPs called Democratic Training by performing entropy-based model enhancement to suppress the effect of the universal adversarial perturbations in a given model. Democratic Training is evaluated with 7 neural networks trained on 5 benchmark datasets and 5 types of state-of-the-art universal adversarial attack methods. The results show that it effectively reduces the attack success rate, improves model robustness and preserves the model accuracy on clean samples.
Discipline
Software Engineering
Areas of Excellence
Digital transformation
Publication
Proceedings of the Thirteenth annual conference, ICLR 2025, Singapore, April 24-26
First Page
1
Last Page
22
Identifier
10.48550/arXiv.2502.05542
City or Country
Singapore
Citation
SUN, Bing; SUN, Jun; and ZHAO, Wei.
Democratic training against universal adversarial perturbations. (2025). Proceedings of the Thirteenth annual conference, ICLR 2025, Singapore, April 24-26. 1-22.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/10279
Creative Commons License

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.
Additional URL
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2502.05542