Publication Type
Journal Article
Version
publishedVersion
Publication Date
1-2002
Abstract
A spatially extended version of the game of prisoner’s dilemma, originally proposed by Nowak and May, is modified to include stochastic updating and found to exhibit scale-invariant behavior. Two critical regimes with different scaling behaviors are found; the corresponding exponents have been determined numerically. Spatially, the critical states are characterized by the existence of delicately balanced networks of defectors separating domains of cooperators; temporally, the evolution of the critical states following local perturbations is characterized by avalanches of various magnitudes, which cause restructuring of the networks of defectors on all scales.
Discipline
Business | Management Sciences and Quantitative Methods | Operations and Supply Chain Management
Research Areas
Operations Management
Publication
Physical Review E
Volume
65
Issue
2
First Page
1
Last Page
6
ISSN
1063-651X
Identifier
10.1103/PhysRevE.65.026134
Publisher
American Physical Society
Citation
LIM, Yun Fong; Chen, Kan; and Jayaprakash, Ciriyam.
Scale-Invariant Behavior in a Spatial Game of Prisoners’ Dilemma. (2002). Physical Review E. 65, (2), 1-6.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research/878
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.
Additional URL
https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevE.65.026134
Included in
Management Sciences and Quantitative Methods Commons, Operations and Supply Chain Management Commons