Publication Type
Journal Article
Version
submittedVersion
Publication Date
11-2023
Abstract
Problem definition: With the rapid growth of the gig economy, on-demand staffing platforms have emerged to help companies manage their temporary workforce. This emerging business-to-business context motivates us to study a new form of supply chain coordination problem. We consider a staffing platform managing an on-demand workforce to serve multiple firms facing stochastic labor demand. Before demand realization, each individual firm can hire permanent employees, whereas the platform determines a compensation rate for potential on-demand workers. After knowing the realized demand, firms in need can request on-demand workers from the platform, and then, the platform operator allocates the available on-demand workforce among the firms. We explore how to maximize and distribute the benefits of an on-demand workforce through coordinating self-interested parties in the staffing system. Methodology/results: We combine game theory and online optimization techniques to address the challenges in incentivizing and coordinating the online workforce. We propose a novel and easily implementable fill rate-based allocation and coordination mechanism that enables the on-demand workforce to be shared optimally when individual firms and the platform operator make decisions in their own interest. We also show that the proposed mechanism can be adapted to the cases when contract terms need to be identical to all firms and when actual demand is unverifiable. Managerial implications: The proposed contract mechanism is in line with the performance-based contracting commonly used in on-demand staffing services. Our results suggest that under an appropriately designed performance-based mechanism, individual firms and the platform operator can share the maximum benefits of on-demand staffing.
Keywords
on-demand staffing, capacity pooling, capacity allocation, supply chain coordination
Discipline
Operations and Supply Chain Management | Strategic Management Policy
Research Areas
Operations Management
Publication
Manufacturing and Service Operations Management
Volume
25
Issue
6
First Page
2216
Last Page
2232
ISSN
1523-4614
Identifier
10.1287/msom.2021.0327
Publisher
Institute for Operations Research and Management Sciences
Citation
LU, Tao; ZHENG, Zhichao; and ZHONG, Yuanguang.
Maximizing the benefits of an on-demand workforce: Fill rate-based allocation and coordination mechanisms. (2023). Manufacturing and Service Operations Management. 25, (6), 2216-2232.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research/7263
Copyright Owner and License
Authors
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.
Additional URL
https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2021.0327