Publication Type

Journal Article

Version

acceptedVersion

Publication Date

9-2019

Abstract

Our paper draws attention to a neglected channel of corruption—the bribe payments by state-owned enterprises (SOEs). This is an important phenomenon as bribe payments by SOEs fruitlessly waste national resources, compromising public welfare and national prosperity. Using a large dataset of 30,249 firms from 50 countries, we show that, in general, SOEs are less likely to pay bribes for achieving organizational objectives owing to their political connectivity. However, in deteriorated institutional environments, SOEs may be subjected to potential managerial rent-seeking behaviors, which disproportionately increase SOE bribe propensity relative to privately owned enterprises. Specifically, our findings highlight the importance of fostering democracy and rule of law, reducing prevalence of corruption and shortening power distance in reducing the incidence of SOE bribery.

Keywords

Agency theory, bribery, institutions theory, managerial rent seeking, state-owned enterprises

Discipline

Business Law, Public Responsibility, and Ethics

Publication

Journal of Business Ethics

Volume

159

First Page

221

Last Page

238

ISSN

0167-4544

Identifier

10.1007/s10551-017-3768-z

Publisher

Springer Verlag (Germany)

Copyright Owner and License

Authors

Additional URL

https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-017-3768-z

Share

COinS