Publication Type

Working Paper

Version

publishedVersion

Publication Date

10-2022

Abstract

The increasing adoption of dual-class shares (DCS)—an ownership structure that gives corporate insiders greater voting power than other shareholders—among newly listed companies has raisedsignificant governance concerns. We investigate the decision to adopt the DCS structure and itsvalue implications in the recent U.S. IPOs. Using founder cultural traits and Silicon Valley lawfirms as instrumental variables, we find significant post-IPO outperformance by firms adopting DCSwith a sunset clause, especially incapacity-based sunset which stipulates that the DCS will ceaseafter founders’ death, incapacitation or departure, compared to non-DCS firms and DCS firms without sunsets. This outperformance is more pronounced for high-tech firms, after Google’s IPO, and for firms that rely more on R&D. DCS firms with sunset provisions have greater operating efficiency, marginal value of cash, and more innovation outputs but lower quality ones, which is in line with the incentive schemes provided to their executives.

Keywords

dual-class shares, sunset provisions, entrenchment, anti-takeover provisions

Discipline

Finance and Financial Management | Operations and Supply Chain Management

Research Areas

Strategy and Organisation

First Page

1

Last Page

59

Identifier

10.2139/ssrn.4242984

Publisher

European Corporate Governance Institute - Finance Working Paper

Additional URL

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4242984

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