Publication Type

Journal Article

Version

publishedVersion

Publication Date

11-2014

Abstract

We hypothesize that poor country-level governance, which makes public information less reliable, induces fund managers to increase their use of semipublic information. Utilizing data from international mutual funds and stocks over the 2000-2009 period, we find that semipublic information-related stock rebalancing can be five times higher in countries with the worst quality of governance than in countries with the best. The use of semipublic information increases price informativeness but also increases information asymmetry and reduces stock liquidity. It also intensified the price impact and liquidity crunch during the recent global financial crisis.

Discipline

Finance | Finance and Financial Management

Research Areas

Finance

Publication

Review of Financial Studies

Volume

27

Issue

11

First Page

3343

Last Page

3387

ISSN

0893-9454

Identifier

10.1093/rfs/hhu046

Publisher

Oxford University Press (OUP): Policy F - Oxford Open Option D

External URL

https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhu046

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