Publication Type

Working Paper

Version

publishedVersion

Publication Date

4-2022

Abstract

We confirm prior evidence that bonds on average are offered at prices below their immediate post-offer secondary market prices. However, in cases where banks lead-manage their own bond offerings the underpricing is significantly less as compared to other non-self-marketed offerings. These findings are robust across various matched samples and selection models. Our results suggest that the bond offering process is characterized by substantive agency conflicts between shareholders of corporations (issuers) and underwriters.

Keywords

Corporate Bond, Bond Offerings, Underpricing, Agency Problem

Discipline

Finance | Finance and Financial Management

Research Areas

Finance

First Page

1

Last Page

50

Identifier

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4052561

Publisher

Singapore Management University Lee Kong Chian School of Business Research Paper Seriesess

City or Country

Singapore

External URL

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4052561

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