Publication Type
Journal Article
Version
acceptedVersion
Publication Date
8-2020
Abstract
In this paper we build a search model with asymmetric information regarding houses' energy efficiency. The objective is to shed light on the house owners' incentives to disclose energy certificates (ECs) in the rental market. Such incentives depend not only on the rent premium for more efficient houses - as previously documented - but also on the implicit rent penalty for unlabeled houses. Interestingly, we show that such a penalty is higher the greater the disclosure rate of ECs in the local market. This suggests that the enforcement of the EC regulation should be more stringent during the early phases, as the boost in the initial disclosure rate would strengthen the incentives for later adoption. We illustrate the theoretical predictions with empirical evidence from the Spanish rental market.
Keywords
Asymmetric information, Energy efficiency, Adoption rate, Rental market, Search
Discipline
Eastern European Studies | Energy Policy | Real Estate
Publication
Energy Economics
Volume
90
First Page
1
Last Page
10
ISSN
0140-9883
Identifier
10.1016/j.eneco.2020.104813
Publisher
Elsevier
Embargo Period
5-23-2021
Citation
BIAN, Xueying and FABRA, Natalia.
Incentives for information provision: Energy efficiency in the Spanish rental market. (2020). Energy Economics. 90, 1-10.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research/6716
Copyright Owner and License
Authors
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.
Additional URL
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eneco.2020.104813