Publication Type
Conference Proceeding Article
Publication Date
12-2011
Abstract
I examine the conditions under which CEOs are terminated as an outcome of firm financial restatements. I find that chief executive‘s power acts to limit terminations,especially in cases of more severe restatements, while board members most closely affiliated with the CEO appear to avoid the stigma of financial restatements by deflecting blame to the CEO, increasing terminations. I also examine the effectiveness of regulatory remedies such as Sarbanes-Oxley, aimed at strongly penalizing CEOs for financial misrepresentation. Sarbanes-Oxley significantly alters the relationship between CEOs and their board. My context is restating U.S. public firms before (1995-1998) and after Sarbanes-Oxley (2003-2006).
Discipline
Organizational Behavior and Theory | Strategic Management Policy
Research Areas
Strategy and Organisation
Publication
Proceedings of the Southwest Academy of Management Conference 2011, Houston, TX, March 9-12
First Page
729
Last Page
751
Publisher
SWAM
City or Country
Houston
Citation
GOMULYA, David.
Don't blame me: The effects of CEO power, board affiliation, and Sarbanes-Oxley on CEO turnover following financial misrepresentation. (2011). Proceedings of the Southwest Academy of Management Conference 2011, Houston, TX, March 9-12. 729-751.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research/6016
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.
External URL
http://www.swamfbd.org/uploads/SWAM_Proceedings_2011.pdf