Publication Type
Journal Article
Version
acceptedVersion
Publication Date
6-2008
Abstract
We examine the effect of poison pill adoptions on firm value, controlling for the adopting firm's preexisting corporate governance structure. We find that only companies with the most democratic governance structures, defined as those with the fewest preexisting protective governance provisions, experience significantly positive abnormal stock returns and significantly positive abnormal revisions in five-year earnings growth rate forecasts. Moreover, regression results indicate that abnormal returns and forecast revisions are significantly related to governance structure and not to board composition or subsequent merger activity.
Discipline
Finance and Financial Management | Portfolio and Security Analysis
Research Areas
Finance
Publication
Journal of Finance and Quantitative Analysis
Volume
43
Issue
2
First Page
381
Last Page
400
ISSN
0022-1090
Identifier
10.1017/S0022109000003562
Publisher
Cambridge University Press
Citation
CATON, Gary L. and GOH, Jeremy C..
Corporate Governance, Shareholder Rights, and Shareholder Rights Plans: Poison, Placebo, or Prescription?. (2008). Journal of Finance and Quantitative Analysis. 43, (2), 381-400.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research/1270
Copyright Owner and License
Authors
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.
Additional URL
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022109000003562