Publication Type
Journal Article
Version
publishedVersion
Publication Date
6-2006
Abstract
The French two-round system of presidential elections forces candidates to choose strategies designed to maximize their votes in two different, potentially conflicting strategic contexts: a first round contest between many candidates, and a second round between (typically) a left- and a right-oriented candidate. Following a constitutional change in 2000, furthermore, presidential elections are synchronized with legislative elections, more tightly linking presidential candidates to the policy platforms of the parties they represent. This article examines the consequences of policy positioning by presidential candidates, measuring, comparing and assessing positioning in the legislative elections and in the first and second presidential election rounds. The measures come from an expert survey taken in 2002, from content analysis of party manifestos and presidential speeches, and from the 2002 French National Election Survey. The findings provide hard empirical confirmation of two commonly perceived propositions: first, that Jospin's first-round loss resulted from strategic error in moving too close to the policy centre, and second, that Chirac's won an overwhelming second-round victory because he collected all of the voters from candidates eliminated in the first round.
Discipline
Eastern European Studies | Political Science
Publication
European Journal of Political Research
Volume
45
Issue
4
First Page
667
Last Page
697
ISSN
0304-4130
Identifier
10.1111/j.1475-6765.2006.00313.x
Publisher
Wiley
Citation
LAVER, Michael, BENOIT, Kenneth, & SAUGER, Nicolas.(2006). Policy competition in the 2002 French legislative and presidential elections. European Journal of Political Research, 45(4), 667-697.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soss_research/3997
Copyright Owner and License
Publisher
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.
Additional URL
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-6765.2006.00313.x