Publication Type

Journal Article

Version

acceptedVersion

Publication Date

12-2020

Abstract

Andrew Forcehimes and Luke Semrau argue that agent-relative consequentialism is implausible because in some circumstances it classes an act as impermissible yet holds that the outcome of all agents performing that impermissible act is preferable. I argue that their problem is closely related to Derek Parfit's problem of ‘direct collective self-defeat’ and show how Parfit's plausible solution to his problem can be adapted to solve their problem.

Keywords

agent-relative consequentialism, agent-relative value, consequentializing, direct collective self-defeat

Discipline

Ethics and Political Philosophy | Personality and Social Contexts

Research Areas

Humanities

Publication

Utilitas

Volume

32

Issue

4

First Page

472

Last Page

478

ISSN

0953-8208

Identifier

10.1017/s0953820820000096

Publisher

Cambridge University Press (CUP): HSS Journals

Additional URL

https://doi.org/10.1017/s0953820820000096

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