Publication Type

Journal Article

Version

publishedVersion

Publication Date

2-2019

Abstract

Whendo sanctions succeed in nuclear inhibition? Is there a generalizable frameworkto estimate sanction effectiveness against nuclear aspirants? Instead ofrelying on partial equilibrium analysis, we conceptualize sanctions as threesequential phases—imposition of economic pain, conversation to politicalpressure, and creation (or failure thereof) of zone of possible agreement(ZOPA). The effectiveness of each phase is subject to phase-specific contextualvariables, an aggregation of which helps measure individual sanction’s effectiveness,conduct cross-case comparison, and estimate one’s replicability in other cases.To illustrate its analytical utility, we analyze the divergent sanctionoutcomes between Iran in 2012-2015 and North Korea 2013-2017. Iran waseconomically more vulnerable, politically less resilient, and its bargainingposition closer to a ZOPA than North Korea was. Our analysis questions theutility of economic sanction in North Korea and helps expanding the discussionaway from the policy obsession with the role of China. Theoretically, it rectifiesan imbalance against qualitative and holistic approach in the sanctionliterature, and contributes to discussions about nuclear inhibitionstrategies.

Keywords

Economic sanction, nuclear proliferation, North Korea, Iran, US foreign policy

Discipline

Asian Studies | Political Economy | Political Science

Research Areas

Political Science

Publication

Asian Perspective -Seoul-

Volume

43

Issue

1

First Page

95

Last Page

122

ISSN

0258-9184

Identifier

10.1353/apr.2019.0003

Publisher

The Institute for Far Eastern Studies

Additional URL

https://doi.org/10.1353/apr.2019.0003

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