Publication Type
Journal Article
Version
publishedVersion
Publication Date
7-1982
Abstract
Clearly, if a man holds a self-contradictory belief, then his belief cannot be rational, for there can be no set of evidence sufficient to justify it. This is most apparent when the self contradictory belief is a belief in a conjunction, (e.g., a belief that p & ~p), rather than when it is a non-conjunctive self-contradictory belief, e.g. a belief that red is not a color.
Discipline
Philosophy
Research Areas
Humanities
Publication
American Philosophical Quarterly
Volume
19
Issue
3
First Page
279
Last Page
286
ISSN
0003-0481
Publisher
University of Pittsburgh
Citation
WILLIAMS, John N..(1982). Believing the Self-Contradictory. American Philosophical Quarterly, 19(3), 279-286.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soss_research/258
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.
Additional URL
https://www.jstor.org/stable/20013967