Publication Type
Journal Article
Version
acceptedVersion
Publication Date
4-2015
Abstract
Foley (2012: 93–98) and Turri (2012: 215–19) have recently given objections to the defeasibility theory of propositional knowledge. Here, I give an objection of a quite different stripe by looking at what the theory must say about knowing that you know. I end with some remarks on how this objection relates to rival theories and how this might be a worry for some of these.
Discipline
Philosophy
Research Areas
Humanities
Publication
Analysis
Volume
75
Issue
2
First Page
213
Last Page
217
ISSN
0003-2638
Identifier
10.1093/analys/anv017
Publisher
Oxford University Press (OUP): Policy E / Wiley: No OnlineOpen
Citation
WILLIAMS, John N..(2015). Not knowing you know: A new objection to the defeasibility theory of knowledge. Analysis, 75(2), 213-217.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soss_research/2483
Copyright Owner and License
Author
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.
Additional URL
https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anv017