Publication Type

Transcript

Version

acceptedVersion

Publication Date

4-2024

Abstract

The General Division of the High Court of Singapore stated (obiter) in Tan Meow Hiang v Ong Kay Yong that it does not have a general power to order that damages or costs be paid in instalments. It reasoned that any such power must have been impliedly restricted by legislation. So instalment orders can only be made (a) by certain subordinate courts; (b) by the General Division on appeal; (c) by the General Division at first instance in personal injury cases. In response, this note aims to advance the conversation on the law on instalment orders and what the Constitution has to say about the courts’ inherent powers. There are possible arguments, based on constitutional principle and/or constitutional history, that legislation purporting to take away certain powers from the courts is unconstitutional, or at least that the courts should be slow to hold that such powers have been taken away. Anyway, the legislation which the General Division cited arguably did not take away the powers to make instalment orders; neither do common-law rules such as the rule that damages are ordered “once and for all”. Therefore, we need not rely on legislative reform to avoid the uneasy conclusion which the General Division felt compelled to reach.

Discipline

Dispute Resolution and Arbitration

Research Areas

Dispute Resolution; Asian and Comparative Legal Systems; Private Law

Areas of Excellence

Growth in Asia

Publication

Civil Justice Quarterly

Volume

43

Issue

2

First Page

106

Last Page

119

ISSN

0261-9261

Publisher

Sweet and Maxwell

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