Publication Type
Journal Article
Version
publishedVersion
Publication Date
1-1990
Abstract
This article attempts to demonstrate, via the famous Hart-Dworkin debate on the nature and functions of judicial discretion, that substantial jurisprudential disputes as well as theories can, and do, arise from misconceived critiques, whether intended or otherwise. It also seeks to show that, whilst Dworkin's initial critique of Hart was misconceived, his theory of adjudication that arose as a result of responses to his initial views is a positive contribution to learning, although I argue that Dworkin's views are not, in the final analysis, sufficiently persuasive to constitute a radical departure from Hart's own views.
Discipline
Contracts | Jurisprudence
Research Areas
Corporate, Finance and Securities Law
Publication
Ratio Juris: An international journal of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law
Volume
3
Issue
3
First Page
385
Last Page
398
ISSN
0952-1917
Identifier
10.1111/j.1467-9337.1990.tb00068.x
Publisher
Wiley
Citation
PHANG, Andrew B.L..
Jurisprudential oaks from mythical acorns: The Hart‐Dworkin debate revisited. (1990). Ratio Juris: An international journal of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law. 3, (3), 385-398.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sol_research/4173
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.
Additional URL
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9337.1990.tb00068.x