Publication Type
Journal Article
Version
acceptedVersion
Publication Date
8-2021
Abstract
According to German legal philosopher Gustav Radbruch, laws that are substantively unjust to an intolerable degree should not be regarded as legally valid, even if they were promulgated according to stipulated procedure. Radbruch’s Formula (as his position has been termed) contradicts the central tenet of legal positivism, according to which the existence of laws does not necessarily depend on their merit. While some legal positivists suppose that legal invalidity based on the content of particular laws is a central tenet of natural law theory, natural law theorists such as John Finnis opine that the lex injusta non est lex maxim has been no more than a subordinate theorem of classical natural law theory. In Finnis’s view, unjust laws give rise to legal obligation “in a legal sense.”
Keywords
unjust laws, natural law theory, Radbruch, constitutional democracy, legal validity, subsidiarity
Discipline
Constitutional Law | Jurisprudence
Research Areas
Legal Theory, Ethics and Legal Education
Publication
Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence
Volume
34
Issue
2
First Page
461
Last Page
491
ISSN
0841-8209
Identifier
10.1017/cjlj.2021.12
Publisher
Cambridge University Press
Embargo Period
2-15-2022
Citation
TAN, Seow Hon.
Radbruch’s Formula revisited: The ‘Lex Injusta Non Est Lex’ Maxim in constitutional democracies. (2021). Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence. 34, (2), 461-491.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sol_research/3808
Copyright Owner and License
Authors
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.
Additional URL
https://doi.org/10.1017/cjlj.2021.12