Publication Type

Journal Article

Version

publishedVersion

Publication Date

6-2017

Abstract

The United Nations Conventionagainst Corruption, regional anti-corruption conventions, the US ForeignCorrupt Practices Act, and laws against foreign bribery passed pursuant to theOECD Convention on Bribery have not operated to substantially reduce foreigncorrupt practices. The “design flaw” in these instruments and laws is that theyabandon the model of domestic anti-bribery laws that target both the supply anddemand side of corruption, and instead focus only on the supply side ofcorruption. Shielded from international accountability, corrupt officials inthe demand side continue to extort bribes from investors and other businessmenwho wish to operate in their countries. Arbitration decisions that considercorruption in the context of investment disputes also leave unsanctionedcorrupt conduct on the part of host country officials. While foreign policy objectives of capitalexporting states would discourage and prevent a full scale attack on supplyside corruption, less controversial measures to discourage and even punishdemand side corruption should be established and enforced if foreign commercialbribery is to be meaningfully addressed.

Keywords

Foreign Corrupt Practices, Foreign Bribery, Bribery and Foreign Investment, Investment Protection Treaties and Bribery, Demand Side Corruption

Discipline

International Trade Law

Publication

Journal of International and Comparative Law

Volume

4

Issue

1

First Page

1

Last Page

37

ISSN

1535-1785

Publisher

Chicago-Kent College of Law

Copyright Owner and License

Austin I Pulle

Additional URL

https://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/jintcl4&div=4&id=&page=

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