Publication Type

Journal Article

Version

acceptedVersion

Publication Date

11-2023

Abstract

I develop a general equilibrium framework to analyze the welfare consequences of product regulations and their international harmonization. In my model, raising product standards reduces a negative consumption externality, but also increases the marginal and fixed costs of production. When product standards are set noncooperatively, the effects of standards on other countries' wages and number of firms are not internalized, giving rise to an international inefficiency. The World Trade Organization's nondiscrimination principle of national treatment only partly addresses this inefficiency. Welfare losses from abandoning national treatment average 2.8%, whereas the maximum welfare gains from efficient cooperation average 11.8%.

Keywords

National treatment, trade, tariff, agreements, gravity, impact, wars

Discipline

Industrial Organization | International Economics

Research Areas

International Economics

Publication

International Economic Review

First Page

1

Last Page

34

ISSN

0020-6598

Identifier

10.1111/iere.12676

Publisher

Wiley

Copyright Owner and License

Authors

Additional URL

https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12676

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