Publication Type

Journal Article

Version

acceptedVersion

Publication Date

12-2019

Abstract

We study how career and wage incentives affect labor productivity through self-selection and incentive effect channels using a two-stage field experiment in Malawi. First, recent secondary school graduates were hired with either career or wage incentives. After employment, a half of workers with career incentives randomly received wage incentives, and a half of workers with wage incentives randomly received career incentives. Career incentives attract higher-performing workers than wage incentives, but do not increase productivity conditional on selection. Wage incentives increase productivity for those recruited through career incentives. Observable characteristics are limited in explaining selection effects of entry-level workers.

Keywords

Career Incentive, Wage Incentive, Internship, Self-selection, Labor Productivity

Discipline

Economics | Labor Economics

Research Areas

Applied Microeconomics

Publication

Review of Economics and Statistics

Volume

102

Issue

5

First Page

839

Last Page

851

ISSN

0034-6535

Identifier

10.1162/rest_a_00854

Publisher

Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press (MIT Press): 12 month embargo

Copyright Owner and License

Authors

Additional URL

https://doi.org/10.1162/rest_a_00854

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