Publication Type
Journal Article
Version
publishedVersion
Publication Date
6-2003
Abstract
In this paper, we show that although the Shapley-Shubik index is immune to the donation paradox in weighted binary games, extension of the index to ternary games along the direction suggested in Felsenthal and Machover (1996, 1997) will cause it to be vulnerable to the paradox and this is the case as long as the number of players in the game exceeds three. This undermines the attractiveness of the Shapley-Shubik index as a measure of a priori voting power.
Keywords
Vote power, binary game, donation paradox
Discipline
Behavioral Economics | Econometrics
Research Areas
Econometrics
Publication
Social Choice and Welfare
Volume
20
Issue
3
First Page
387
Last Page
403
ISSN
0176-1714
Identifier
10.1007/s003550200186
Publisher
Springer
Citation
CHUA, Vincent C. H. and Huang, H. C..
The Shapley-Shubik Index, the Donation Paradox and Ternary Games. (2003). Social Choice and Welfare. 20, (3), 387-403.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/206
Copyright Owner and License
Publisher
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.
Additional URL
https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550200186