Publication Type
Journal Article
Version
acceptedVersion
Publication Date
1-2012
Abstract
Motivated by the Somali fishermen–pirates, I explore the time allocation decision of potential pirates between piracy and an alternative non-violent occupation, fishing, when the returns of both piracy and fishing are sensitive to patrolling intensity. For a range of parameters, the static model yields multiple equilibria, an “efficient” one with no patrolling and low piracy, a less efficient equilibrium with intermediate levels of both piracy and patrolling and a highly inefficient high-patrolling high-piracy equilibrium. Analyzing the dynamic analogue, I obtain the surprising result that sufficiently low patrolling can be a good strategy.
Keywords
Pirates, Fishermen, Patrolling, Multiple equilibria, Policy responses
Discipline
Behavioral Economics
Research Areas
Applied Microeconomics
Publication
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
Volume
81
Issue
1
First Page
29
Last Page
38
ISSN
0167-2681
Identifier
10.1016/j.jebo.2011.09.012
Publisher
Elsevier
Citation
GUHA, Brishti.
Pirates and Fishermen: Is Less Patrolling Always Bad?. (2012). Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. 81, (1), 29-38.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1346
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.
Additional URL
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2011.09.012