Publication Type
Journal Article
Version
submittedVersion
Publication Date
10-2012
Abstract
We propose an evolutionary analysis of a voting game where citizens have a preference for conformism that adds to the instrumental preference for the electoral outcome. Multiple equilibria arise, and some generate high turnout. Simulations of best response dynamics show that high turnout is asymptotically stable if conformism matters but its likelihood depends on the reference group for conformism: high turnout is more likely when voters care about their own group's choice, as this better overrides the free rider problem of voting games. Comparative statics on the voting cost distribution, the population's size or the groups' composition are also done.
Keywords
Turnout, coordination games, Poisson games, conformism, selection dynamics.
Discipline
Behavioral Economics | Political Science
Research Areas
Applied Microeconomics
Publication
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control
Volume
36
Issue
10
First Page
1431
Last Page
1447
ISSN
0165-1889
Identifier
10.1016/j.jedc.2012.02.010
Publisher
Elsevier
Citation
LANDI, Massimiliano and Sodini, Mauro.
An Evolutionary Analysis of Turnout with Conformist Citizens. (2012). Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control. 36, (10), 1431-1447.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1245
Copyright Owner and License
Authors
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.
Additional URL
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2012.02.010