Publication Type
Journal Article
Version
publishedVersion
Publication Date
8-2012
Abstract
Information asymmetry in financial markets relates to the idea that one party to a transaction has better information than the other. Since financial reporting involves the transmission of value-relevant enterprise information, we investigate whether the quality of reported earnings can contribute to differentially informed financial market participants. Higher information asymmetry is costly as it increases the adverse selection risk for market participants and lowers liquidity. For a large sample of NYSE and NASDAQ firms, we show that (i) poor earnings quality is significantly and incrementally associated with higher information asymmetry, (ii) earnings quality disproportionately affects information asymmetry for firms with poor information environments, (iii) both innate and discretionary components of earnings quality increase information asymmetry, and (iv) poor earnings quality exacerbates the information asymmetry around earnings announcements. Our results suggest that standard-setters’ efforts to develop accounting standards that improve earnings quality should contribute to a better information environment for market participants and increase stock liquidity.
Keywords
Accounting information, Financial markets, Capital allocation, Earnings quality, Analytical models
Discipline
Accounting | Corporate Finance
Research Areas
Financial Intermediation and Information
Publication
Contemporary Accounting Research
Volume
30
Issue
2
First Page
482
Last Page
516
ISSN
0823-9150
Identifier
10.1111/j.1911-3846.2012.01161.x
Publisher
Wiley
Citation
BHATTACHARYA, Nilabhra; Desai, Hemang; and Venkataraman, Kumar.
Does earnings quality affect information asymmetry? Evidence from trading costs. (2012). Contemporary Accounting Research. 30, (2), 482-516.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soa_research/959
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.
Additional URL
http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1911-3846.2012.01161.x