Publication Type
Journal Article
Version
acceptedVersion
Publication Date
9-2013
Abstract
This paper investigates the impact of the founding family’s presence on CEO turnover decisions. We find that family firms managed by CEOs outside the founding family (i.e., professional CEO family firms) have higher CEO turnover-performance sensitivity than family firms managed by family members (i.e., family CEO firms) or non-family firms. These results are robust to alternative performance measures and CEO turnover definitions. Additional analyses indicate that higher family ownership leads to even higher (lower) turnover-performance sensitivity in professional CEO family firms (family CEO firms). These results indicate that, with regard to CEO turnover decisions, better monitoring of CEOs by family owners leads to the alleviation of agency conflicts, but the power of family CEOs leads to potential family entrenchment.
Keywords
family firms, CEO turnover, agency problems, family monitoring
Discipline
Accounting | Corporate Finance | Human Resources Management
Research Areas
Corporate Reporting and Disclosure
Publication
Contemporary Accounting Research
Volume
30
Issue
3
First Page
1166
Last Page
1190
ISSN
0823-9150
Identifier
10.1111/j.1911-3846.2012.01185.x
Publisher
Wiley
Citation
CHEN, Xia; CHENG, Qiang; and DAI, Zhonglan.
Family Ownership and CEO Turnovers. (2013). Contemporary Accounting Research. 30, (3), 1166-1190.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soa_research/875
Copyright Owner and License
Authors
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.
Additional URL
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1911-3846.2012.01185.x