Publication Type

Journal Article

Version

publishedVersion

Publication Date

5-2025

Abstract

This study provides new evidence on the association of state ownership and tax planning by showing that a state owner’s monitoring incentives affect a firm’s tax planning. Using the setting of a developed market economy, Germany, we distinguish between state owners that directly benefit from state-owned enterprises’ (SOEs’) income tax payments and those that do not. Our results indicate that state ownership is not associated with less tax planning unless the state owner directly benefits from higher tax payments. These results are robust to various specifications and suggest that shareholders’ monitoring incentives are a determinant of a firm’s tax planning activities.

Keywords

Tax avoidance, Monitoring, Ownership structure, State owned enterprises

Discipline

Accounting | Nonprofit Administration and Management | Public Affairs, Public Policy and Public Administration

Research Areas

Corporate Reporting and Disclosure

Publication

Journal of Accounting and Public Policy

Volume

51

First Page

1

Last Page

20

ISSN

0278-4254

Identifier

10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2025.107307

Publisher

Elsevier

Copyright Owner and License

Authors-CC-BY

Creative Commons License

Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 License.

Additional URL

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2025.107307

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