Publication Type
Journal Article
Version
acceptedVersion
Publication Date
1-2024
Abstract
We examine the effect of the common ownership relation between brokerage houses and the firms covered by their analysts (referred to as co-owned brokerage houses, co-owned firms, and connected analysts, respectively) on analyst forecast performance. Common ownership can help the connected analysts have better access to co-owned firms, leading to higher-quality analyst research. However, common owners have incentives for higher valuation of the co-owned firms and thus can exert pressure on the connected analysts to issue optimistically biased research reports for these firms. We find that common ownership improves analyst forecast accuracy. This result is robust to a difference-in-differences design that exploits exogenous shocks to common ownership. The effects vary systematically with the quality of alternative sources of information that analysts can access for the co-owned firms. Overall, our paper contributes to the literature by documenting that common ownership can facilitate information communication.
Keywords
common ownership, analyst forecasts, institutional environments
Discipline
Accounting | Corporate Finance
Research Areas
Corporate Reporting and Disclosure
Publication
European Accounting Review
Volume
33
Issue
1
First Page
223
Last Page
249
ISSN
0963-8180
Identifier
10.1080/09638180.2022.2082506
Publisher
Taylor and Francis Group
Citation
CHENG, Qiang; LUO, Shuqing; and ZHANG, Jinping.
Common ownership and analyst forecasts. (2024). European Accounting Review. 33, (1), 223-249.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soa_research/2031
Copyright Owner and License
Authors
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.
Additional URL
https://doi.org/10.1080/09638180.2022.2082506