Can honesty reminders reduce dishonesty in budgetary slack?
Publication Type
Journal Article
Publication Date
1-2023
Abstract
This study investigates the effect of honesty reminders on budgetary slack. Based on self-concept maintenance theory, the authors posit that honesty reminders can reduce budgetary slack by making people more aware of their own standards of honesty, resulting in more honest behavior. Using an experimental research design, the authors find evidence that honesty reminders reduce budgetary slack. The authors also find that although penalties can similarly reduce budgetary slack, they tend to cause distrust and resentment from subordinates. Therefore, honesty reminders may be a less costly method than penalties for reducing budgetary slack.
Keywords
Budgetary slack, honesty reminders, dishonesty thresholds, trust, self-concept maintenance theory, experimental research, participative budgeting
Discipline
Business Law, Public Responsibility, and Ethics | Corporate Finance
Research Areas
Corporate Reporting and Disclosure
Publication
Advances in Management Accounting
Volume
34
First Page
203
Last Page
226
ISSN
1474-7871
Identifier
10.1108/S1474-787120220000034008
Publisher
Emerald
Citation
CHENG, Wilfred W. H.; LIM, Chee Yeow; and YUEN, Chi Kwan.
Can honesty reminders reduce dishonesty in budgetary slack?. (2023). Advances in Management Accounting. 34, 203-226.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soa_research/2003
Additional URL
https://doi.org/10.1108/S1474-787120220000034008