Publication Type
Journal Article
Version
acceptedVersion
Publication Date
4-2021
Abstract
We analyze the consequences of a firm hiring a generalist CEO in terms of the audit fees paid by the firm. We find that audit fees of clients with generalist CEOs are higher than those of clients with specialist CEOs. This relation is robust to considering managerial ability, other CEO characteristics, various fixed effects, instrumental variables, and change analyses. We further show that fee differences are larger for firms with weaker monitoring and higher corporate litigation risks. Through path analysis, we find that both client business risk and misreporting risk contribute to the fee difference. Finally, we find that auditors are more likely to issue going-concern opinions to clients with generalist CEOs. Our study should be of interest to auditing standard setters who link management operating styles to audit risk. We shed light on how management operating styles associated with the CEOs' general or specialized skills affect audit pricing.
Keywords
Generalist CEOs, managerial skills, audit risk, agency problem
Discipline
Accounting | Corporate Finance
Research Areas
Corporate Governance, Auditing and Risk Management
Publication
Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory
Volume
40
Issue
4
First Page
123
Last Page
147
ISSN
0278-0380
Identifier
10.2308/AJPT-18-086
Publisher
American Accounting Association
Citation
1
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.
Additional URL
https://doi.org/10.2308/AJPT-18-086