Publication Type
Journal Article
Version
publishedVersion
Publication Date
9-2019
Abstract
In a panel across twenty-eight countries over 10 years, we show that family firms on average enjoy performance advantages over nonfamily firms only when labor markets are less regulated. We confirm this result in a matched firm sample using a survey-based instrument as a family control. Furthermore, family firms exhibit lower variation in employment levels in less-regulated labor markets, supporting the notion that labor relations drive family firms’ performance advantages. Our results are consistent with the notion that both family ownership and labor market reforms provide employment protection and thus partly substitute as governance mechanisms.
Keywords
Family firms, Labor market regulation
Discipline
Accounting | Entrepreneurial and Small Business Operations
Research Areas
Corporate Reporting and Disclosure
Publication
Review of Corporate Finance Studies
Volume
8
Issue
2
First Page
348
Last Page
379
ISSN
2046-9128
Identifier
10.1093/rcfs/cfz005
Publisher
Oxford University Press
Embargo Period
4-17-2020
Citation
BENNEDSEN, Morten; HUANG, Sterling; WAGNER, Hannes F.; and ZEUME, Stefan.
Family firms and labor market regulation. (2019). Review of Corporate Finance Studies. 8, (2), 348-379.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soa_research/1834
Copyright Owner and License
Authors
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.
Additional URL
https://doi.org/10.1093/rcfs/cfz005