Publication Type

Journal Article

Version

publishedVersion

Publication Date

9-2019

Abstract

In a panel across twenty-eight countries over 10 years, we show that family firms on average enjoy performance advantages over nonfamily firms only when labor markets are less regulated. We confirm this result in a matched firm sample using a survey-based instrument as a family control. Furthermore, family firms exhibit lower variation in employment levels in less-regulated labor markets, supporting the notion that labor relations drive family firms’ performance advantages. Our results are consistent with the notion that both family ownership and labor market reforms provide employment protection and thus partly substitute as governance mechanisms.

Keywords

Family firms, Labor market regulation

Discipline

Accounting | Entrepreneurial and Small Business Operations

Research Areas

Corporate Reporting and Disclosure

Publication

Review of Corporate Finance Studies

Volume

8

Issue

2

First Page

348

Last Page

379

ISSN

2046-9128

Identifier

10.1093/rcfs/cfz005

Publisher

Oxford University Press

Embargo Period

4-17-2020

Copyright Owner and License

Authors

Additional URL

https://doi.org/10.1093/rcfs/cfz005

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