Publication Type

Journal Article

Version

submittedVersion

Publication Date

5-2019

Abstract

Coordination failure among owners of heterogeneous debt types increases distress costs. Covenants reduce expected distress costs by lowering the probability of liquidity shortages, increasing liquidation values, and incentivizing creditor monitoring. We predict and find that new debt contracts include more covenants when borrowers' existing debt structures are more heterogeneous. Our findings suggest that covenants are not only used to address creditor-shareholder conflicts but also to reduce the expected costs of coordination failure among creditors. Further, our results indicate a dynamic component missing from static debt structure models: Debt heterogeneity entails additional covenants (i.e., constraints) when raising future debt.

Keywords

Debt Heterogeneity, Debt Covenants, Creditor Conflicts, Coordination Failure

Discipline

Accounting | Corporate Finance

Research Areas

Finance

Publication

Management Science

ISSN

0025-1909

Identifier

10.1287/mnsc.2018.3141

Publisher

INFORMS (Institute for Operations Research and Management Sciences)

Copyright Owner and License

Authors

Additional URL

https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2018.3141

Download

Share

COinS