Publication Type

Working Paper

Publication Date

1-2018

Abstract

An analytical model of voluntary disclosure in which a manager can disclose through two channels with different ease of processing, and with two types of investors. The model shows that in the presence of a second channel, managers have an incentive to decrease disclosures that will be quickly processed by unsophisticated investors and to increase the disclosures that will be quickly processed by sophisticated investors. The model has implications for post Reg-FD market efficiency, as well as the efficiency of firms having multiple disclosure venues.

Discipline

Accounting

Research Areas

Corporate Reporting and Disclosure

Comments

Dissertation paper, University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign 2016 2017 Jan -- Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance Symposium, IIM Ahmedabad

Additional URL

https://ssrn.com/abstract=3225226

Included in

Accounting Commons

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