Publication Type
Working Paper
Publication Date
1-2018
Abstract
An analytical model of voluntary disclosure in which a manager can disclose through two channels with different ease of processing, and with two types of investors. The model shows that in the presence of a second channel, managers have an incentive to decrease disclosures that will be quickly processed by unsophisticated investors and to increase the disclosures that will be quickly processed by sophisticated investors. The model has implications for post Reg-FD market efficiency, as well as the efficiency of firms having multiple disclosure venues.
Discipline
Accounting
Research Areas
Corporate Reporting and Disclosure
Citation
CROWLEY, Richard M..
Voluntary disclosure with multiple channels and investor sophistication. (2018).
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soa_research/1775
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.
Additional URL
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3225226
Comments
Dissertation paper, University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign 2016 2017 Jan -- Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance Symposium, IIM Ahmedabad