Publication Type
Working Paper
Publication Date
1-2009
Abstract
We examine country-level determinants of private information search incentives, and whether analysts’ role in constraining managers’ opportunistic earnings management varies across countries. In a sample of 31,312 firm-year observations originating from 30 countries, we document that: (1) analyst coverage is negatively (positively) related to the level of corporate disclosure (how secretive the national culture is); (2) the negative association between analyst coverage and earnings management is observed in stronger investor protection countries but not in weaker investor protection countries; and (3) analyst monitoring fails to mitigate culturedriven earnings manipulations in countries with more individualistic and uncertainty-tolerant cultures. Taken together, financial analysts’ role in constraining opportunistic earnings management across countries appears to vary with corporate disclosure and cultural environments.
Keywords
Analyst Coverage, Earnings Management, Corporate Disclosure, National Culture, Investor Protection
Discipline
Finance and Financial Management | International Business | Portfolio and Security Analysis | Sociology of Culture
First Page
1
Last Page
27
Identifier
10.2139/ssrn.1277209
Citation
HAN, Soongsoo; KANG, Tony; LOBO, Gerald; and YOO, Yong Keun.
International evidence on analyst monitoring and earnings management: The roles of corporate disclosure and national culture. (2009). 1-27.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soa_research/1745
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.
Additional URL
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1277209
Included in
Finance and Financial Management Commons, International Business Commons, Portfolio and Security Analysis Commons, Sociology of Culture Commons