Publication Type
Journal Article
Version
publishedVersion
Publication Date
1-2019
Abstract
We examine how board co-option, defined as the fraction of the board comprising directors appointed after the CEO assumed office, is related to clawback adoption. We find that co-opted boards have a lower probability of adopting clawback provisions. Further, the negative association between board co-option and clawback adoption is more pronounced when at least one co-opted member is on the compensation committee and when there is a higher likelihood that a clawback provision will be triggered. Finally, we find that board co-option is an important mechanism through which longer-tenured CEOs reduce the likelihood of clawback adoption.
Keywords
Clawbacks, Co-opted boards, Corporate governance
Discipline
Accounting | Corporate Finance
Research Areas
Corporate Reporting and Disclosure
Publication
European Accounting Review
Volume
28
Issue
1
First Page
101
Last Page
127
ISSN
0963-8180
Identifier
10.1080/09638180.2018.1446036
Publisher
Taylor and Francis
Citation
HUANG, Sterling; LIM, Chee Yeow; and NG, Jeffrey.
Not clawing the hand that feeds you: The case of co-opted boards and clawbacks. (2019). European Accounting Review. 28, (1), 101-127.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soa_research/1423
Copyright Owner and License
Authors
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.
Additional URL
https://doi.org/10.1080/09638180.2018.1446036